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20140314美國國會臺灣關係法35週年聽證會影音及完整中英文逐字稿
Renee 何宇理 編譯

Kin Moy--國務院副助理國務卿負責東亞和太平洋事務的金莫伊
(Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs)

眾議院外交事務委員會 (House Foreign Affairs Committee)

Ed Royce, California, Chairman (113th) 埃德· 羅伊斯，加州，主席
Chris Smith, New Jersey克里斯· 史密斯，新澤西
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Florida, former Chairwoman (112th) 伊萊亞娜羅斯 - 萊赫蒂寧
，佛羅里達州，原董事長（第112號）
Steve Chabot, Ohio史蒂夫‧夏波，俄亥俄
Randy Weber, Texas 蘭迪· 韋伯，德州共和黨
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania斯科特· 佩里，賓夕法尼亞
Eliot Engel, New York, Ranking Member艾略特恩格爾，美國眾議員（民主黨）紐約，排
名會員
Brad Sherman, California布拉德· 謝爾曼，美國加州
Eni Faleomavaega, American Samoa (Democrat) 埃尼法列歐馬瓦埃加，美屬薩摩亞（&#
8203;?民主黨）
Alan Lowenthal, California democrat 艾倫‧洛文塔爾，加州民主黨
Gerry Connolly, Virginia 格里康諾利，維吉尼亞州 (民主黨)
開場白 Opening Statements

羅伊斯 (加州，主席; 共和黨 ) (Mr. Royce)

Hearing on the promise of TRA. It’s been 35 years, for that period of time,
TRA has served as the legal framework governing the important relationship
between U.S. and Republic of China, Taiwan. Since the act came into force in
1979, there have been few other pieces of foreign policy legislation as
consequential as the TRA. Indeed, it is the steadfast support of the US
Congress that has helped Taiwan to be the way it is today: a thriving modern
society that strongly supports human rights, strongly supports rule of law, the
free market. The purpose of today's hearing is to consider whether the
Administration is doing enough to fulfill the promise of the TRA.

對台灣關係法所承諾的聴證會。35年來，台灣關係法是美國和中華民國，台灣之間


America’s support for Taiwan is now more important than ever. It is vital that
we speak with one voice, when it comes to our support for Taiwan. Strengthening
the relationship with Taiwan is one of the Committee’s top legislative
priorities. In fact, I have led two bipartisan delegations to Taipei within the
last 13 months.



Last year, our delegation trip included a visit to Taiwan’s WWII era
submarines based near Kaohsiung.  And in just last month, the committee
delegation of eight members of Congress traveled to Tainan to see first hand,
the fleet of fighter jets that serves as the backbone of the Taiwanese air
force. The fact that the first batch of these jets entered into service in 1965
is a stark reminder that Taiwan needs continuous support in order to maintain
deterrence across the Taiwan Strait.



On this front, I reluctantly submit that we are not doing enough to meet the
spirit of the TRA. We need to do more here in the U.S. And just as necessary is
the defense sales are to Taiwan, it is equally important that the US actively
support Taiwan’s efforts to maintain and expand its diplomatic space. When it
comes to matters of public safety or public health, the U.S. must do its utmost
to ensure that Taiwan has a seat at the table. For this reason, I authored the
legislation that was signed into law, to help Taiwan participate in the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) last year.



Taiwan’s absence from ICAO prevents it from obtaining air safety information
in real time. The recent disappearance of the Malaysian aircraft highlights the
importance of cooperation in the aviation field. As a result of my legislation,
Taiwan has finally been able to have a seat in ICAO for the first time since
1976. Taiwan‘s participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Free Trade
Agreement is an important opportunity that we must not overlook.

台灣若缺席於國際民航組織，會阻止它獲得航空安全信息的實時性。最近馬來西亞飛機的
失踪，顯示了航空領域合作的重要性。由於我所提上述的法律的結果，台灣終於在
1976年來，第一次在國際民航組織裡有一個席位。讓台灣參與的跨太平洋夥伴關係自由貿
易協定，是一個我們不可忽視的重要機會。

By working to include Taiwan in a high quality, multi-lateral trade agreement,
the US will be helping to preserve Taiwan’s ability to do business
internationally. The events unfolding in the Ukraine remind us of the strategic
weakness of relying on one major trading partner. I understand that the
government of Taiwan will soon announce its intention to seek membership in TPP
 As the Chairman of the committee, I strongly urge the Administration to
support Taiwan’s inclusion in TPP. America’s consumers and exporters would
benefit.



The story of Taiwan is really a story about transformation. From the grinding
poverty of the post war era, to a military dictatorship, to a thriving multi-
party democracy, the investment that the American people made in Taiwan has
more than paid off. Today Taiwan is a beacon of democracy in a region of the
world that still yearns for freedom. The good people of Taiwan have also been a
part of American’s own success story, with many Taiwanese-Americans
participating as leaders of business, and government, and leaders of their own
community.



As we acknowledge the 35th anniversary of the TRA, let us come together to
support and strengthen the US-Taiwan relationship. Our actions will directly
impact the future of Taiwan and our strategic and economic standing in the
critical Asia-Pacific region.

當我們紀念台灣關係法35週年，讓我們一起支持和加強美台關係，我們的動作將直接影響
台灣的未來，以及我們在亞太地區關鍵的的戰略和經濟地位。



恩格爾 (紐約; 民主黨) (Mr. Engel) (6:30)

 I am a big supporter of Taiwan, and have traveled there many times. The most
recently being with [Royce] last year. I want to agree with everything you just
said about Taiwan. Next month marks the 35 anniversary of the TRA, the Act
passed in 1979 is the cornerstone of the relationship between our two nations.
It’s been instrumental in maintaining peace and security across Taiwan Strait
and in East Asia, and serves as official basis of friendship and cooperation
between the US and Taiwan.



I am proud to be a lead sponsor with you, Mr. Chairman, on H.R.494, which we
have affirmed the importance and relevance of TRA three decades after its
adoption. Taiwan is a flourishing, multi-party democracy of over 23 million
people with a vibrant free market economy. It is a leading trade partner of US,
along with bigger countries like Brazil and India.



Over the past 60 years, US-Taiwan relationship has undergone dramatic changes.
Taiwan’s development into a robust and lively democracy underpins the strong
US-Taiwan friendship we enjoy today. Our relationship with Taiwan was initially
defined by a shared strategic purpose of stopping the spread of communism in
Asia. At the end of the Cold War, Taiwan’s political evolution from
authoritarianism to one of the strongest democratic systems in Asia, has
transformed the US-Taiwan relationship from one based solely on shared interest
to one based on shared values.



One of the main obligations of the US under the TRA is to make available to
Taiwan defensive arms so that Taiwan is able to maintain sufficient self-
defense capabilities. Despite the improvement on the political and economic
ties between Taiwan and mainland China, Beijing’s military buildup opposite
Taiwan is continuing and the balance of cross-strait military forces continue
to shift toward China’s favor.



I encourage the Administration to work closely with the Congress in meeting our
obligations under the TRA, and to provide Taiwan with defensive weapons it
requires. In that light, I am very concerned about the decision of the US Air
Force not to fund the so called CAPES program (Combat Avionics Programmed
Extension Suite) in next year’s budget that would have upgraded the avionics
system of the F16 fighter jets including of about 150 of Taiwan’s F16s. The
Taiwan Defense Ministry now faces the tough decision of how to move forward
about the upgrade of its fighters at a reasonable cost, an upgrade that it
desperately needs.



I hope our witness will be able to shed some light on this issue, and on our
way forward for Taiwan and US. Taiwan’s political, economic and social
transformation over the last 60 years has demonstrated that a state can be
modern, democratic, and thoroughly Chinese. Taiwan’s example is an inspiration
for other countries in Asia and throughout the world that linger under the
control of one person or one party. The fact that Taiwan has now held five
direct presidential elections is a clear sign of political maturity of the
Taiwanese people and frankly a signal to Beijing that any change in relations
between China and Taiwan cannot be imposed by the mainland.


。

For many years I have been a staunch supporter of the people of Taiwan and I
will continue to lead efforts here in Congress to demonstrate continued US
support for Taiwan. I think it is a moral obligation for the US to defend
Taiwan and to be in support of and stand with Taiwan.

多年來，我一直是台灣人民的堅定支持者，我將繼續在美國國會努力，展現美國對台灣的
繼續支持。我認為保衛台灣，並支持和站在台灣的立場，是美國應有的道德義務。

夏波 (俄亥; 共和黨) (Mr. Chabot) (10:50)

I was pleased to join you in traveling to Taiwan a couple of weeks ago, and I
think we had a productive trip and certainly in meeting with several of the top
officials, especially President Ma. I know my colleague and I were very happy
with our warm reception and the many courtesies…

我很高興和你一起在幾個星期前前往台灣，我認為我們的訪問是很有收穫，尤其是會晤了
一些高級官員和馬總統。我知道我的同事和我都非常喜歡他們給我們的熱情接待...

As one of the original founding co-chairs of the Congressional Taiwan Caucus, I
am, of course, a strong supporter of a strong US-Taiwan alliance. Taiwan is a
democracy, is a loyal friend and ally, and it deserves to be treated as such by
the US Government. As we commemorate the 35th anniversary of TRA this year, it
’s only appropriate that we strive to move even closer to the policy
objectives set out in that landmark piece of legislation, chief among which, is
the principle that our diplomatic relationship with the People’s Republic of
China is premised on the expectation that the future of Taiwan would be
determined by peaceful means.



For over 30 decades, the TRA has served as the cornerstone of the US-Taiwan
relations. Along with President Reagan’s Six Assurances of 1979, the TRA has
played an indispensible role in the maintenance of peace and security in the
Eastern Asian Pacific region. Taiwan has come a long way since 1979. It has
conducted direct presidential elections, something that would have been
unthinkable back in 1979. These open and vigorously contested electoral
campaigns testified the values of pluralism, transparency and the rule of law,
shared by our two nations that deeply rooted in Taiwanese society.



At the same time, the threat of military aggression posed by the PRC to Taiwan
has grown exponentially over the years. When I first came to the Congress back
in 1995, China had a couple hundreds of missiles, and…there are now 1,600
short, mid-range ballistic missile [pointed at Taiwan]. …



謝爾曼 (加州; 民主黨) (Mr. Sherman) (13:07)

…I remember Mr. Chabot leading us in our effort to seek the release on
humanitarian parole of the former president, Mr. Chen. I don’t think we can
conclude one way or the other about the judicial determination there. But
certainly given his poor health, given his service to the country, and given
the unifying effect this would have, I’d hoped that we would continue to press
for the humanitarian treatment and release of Mr. Chen. I think that it is
important that we provide Taiwan for the tools to defend itself. But Taiwan
needs to act as well; Taiwan spends less than $11 billion on its defense; less
than 1/5th per capita what we Americans do. And God blessed us with the Pacific
Oceans separating us from China; Taiwan only has the Taiwan Straits. On a
percentage of GDP basis, Taiwan only roughly spends half of what we do. So we
should be willing to sell them the tools, and they should be willing to spend
the money to buy these tools.




I am also concerned with the reduction in the reserve requirements imposed on
the young people in Taiwan for military service. Finally, I disagree slightly
with the Chairman—I do want to see Taiwan involved in the trade negotiations
so long as America is out of those negotiations until those times when we
revamp our own trade policy which has given the largest trade deficit in the
history in the life of the planet.


莫伊 (國務院副助理國務卿負責東亞和太平洋事務) (Kin Moy) (15:52)

I am grateful to appear today to share news about the strength, substance and
success of our unofficial US-Taiwan relationship. I wish to thank you, Mr.
Chairman, for your leadership and strong interest in regional prosperity and
stability. Your commitment was evidenced by the large Congressional delegation
you led last month to Taiwan, Japan and South Korea. As you noted earlier in
your remarks, April 10th marks the 35th anniversary of the TRA. The resilience
and development of our robust relationship with Taiwan in the last 35 years has
been greatly fostered by the framework that the Congress has established in the
TRA. The US-Taiwan relations are grouted in history and our shared values, and
our common commitment to democracy and human rights. Maintaining and deepening
a strong relationship with Taiwan is an important part of the US’s rebalance
to the Asian-Pacific region.

我很感謝讓我今天能出席，來分享有關我們非官方的美台關係的實力，內容和成就的消息
。我要感謝您，主席先生，您的領導和您對[台灣]地區的繁榮與穩定的強烈興趣。您上個


Through the American Institute in Taiwan, we work closely with Taiwan
authorities in a wide range of issues. In security, maintenance of peace across
the Taiwan Strait is crucial to stability and prosperity throughout the Asian-
Pacific region. The Obama Administration has notified Congress of over $12
billion worth of arms sales to Taiwan. This is a tangible sign of the
seriousness with which we regard Taiwan’s security. We encourage Taiwan to
adopt an innovator or innovative approaches to maintain a credible self-defense
capacity on an austere defense budget and in order to effectively deter
coercion or aggression.



In a region experiencing tension, US appreciates Taiwan’s cooperation to
peacefully resolve disputes and share resources. In the area of economy and
economic engagement, in 2013, Taiwan was the 16th largest export market for US
goods, and the 8th largest export market for the US agricultural, fish, and
forestry products. In 2012, direct investment from Taiwan to US stood at
approximately at $7.9 billion. Our commercial relationship with the people of
Taiwan is vibrant and continues to grow. Last year, we were pleased to hold two
large delegations of Taiwan business leaders, first at the SelectUSA summit at
the end of October, and then again in mid November during a visit of Taiwan’s
CEOs, led by former Vice-President Vincent Siew. The Siew delegation brought
over $2 billion in new or ongoing Taiwan manufacturing investments in the US.



In March, 2013, we restarted our engagement with Taiwan under our Trade and
Investment Framework Agreement, otherwise known as TIFA after a six year hiatus
 We have taken note of Taiwan’s intention of formulating a new economic
reform, demonstrated its willingness and capabilities in joining in regional
economic integration initiatives. The US will continue to encourage Taiwan, to
further liberalize its trade and investment measures.



International Space for Taiwan (19:10)

And as you noted, Mr. Chairman, the area of concern, also, to us is Taiwan’s
international space. As a top 20 world economy and a full member of WTO and
APEC, Taiwan plays a constructive role in the Asian Pacific region and
worldwide. Taiwan participates in about 60 international organizations, as well
as hundreds of international non-government organizations. US supports Taiwan’
s membership in international organizations that do not require statehood for
membership, and we support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in other
international organizations.


8203;以國家身分參加的國際組織，我們支持台灣有意義的參與其他國際組織。

We are pleased that since 2009, Taiwan has participated, every year, in the
World Health Assembly (WHA) as an observer. We welcome Taiwan’s participation
at the International Civil Aviation Organization assembly in Montreal in 2013
as Guest of the ICAO council president. We support Taiwan’s expanded
participation in the future. We also encourage the UN, UN system agencies and
other international organizations to increase Taiwan participation in technical
or expert meetings.







Taiwan’s role as a responsible player in the global community has been well
demonstrated by its disaster relief efforts in the region. Taiwan was a quick
and generous donor of supplies and funding after the 2011 triple disaster in
Japan, and after last November’s Typhoon Haiyan of the Philippines. In short,
Taiwan [is] a stable and capable friend in the region, contributing to peace
and security. Finally, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I thank you
again for the opportunity to appear today to highlight the strength and
durability of ties between the people of the United States and the people on
Taiwan, and to underscore substance of the successes of our cooperative efforts
within the context of unofficial relations. Taiwan has earned a respected place
in the world. Every society wishes dignity for itself, and people on Taiwan are
no exception. Thanks to the Taiwan Relations Act, people of goodwill in the
United States and on Taiwan have a firm foundation to further strengthen our
robust relationship (for the benefit of both our peoples).

作為一個負責任的團員，台灣在國際社會的角色，已經通過它在該地區的救災工作充分證
明。台灣在2011年當日本的三合一災難 [地震、海嘯、核電意外] 以及去年十一月菲律賓
的颱風海燕發生後，是物資和資金的快速和慷慨的捐助者。總之，台灣[是我們]在該地區


Questions and Answer Session

羅伊斯 (加州，主席; 共和黨 ) (Mr. Royce)

There is one thing that is disappointing to me. I often speak on the phone to
the Assistant Director Danny Russell, and I believe that he intended to be here
to testify...But time after time, and this is something that the Subcommittee
of the Asian-Pacific [Region] has talked to me about, for whatever reason, the
Administration pulls the witnesses. And I know it is not the lack of engagement
on the part of Danny Russell. We’ve talked to him repeatedly about the issues.
There is something about the relationship here with the State Department, when
Eliot Engel and I make these request, or when Subcommittee Chairman Chabot on
the Asian Pacific Subcommittee with Mr. Faleomavaega [make the request], for
some reason, the witnesses are always canceled.

有一件事實在令我人失望。我常和副理事長丹尼· 羅素通電話，而我相信他有打算來這裡
作證。 但是一次又一次，而這一點亞太[地區]的小組委員會已經跟我提起，不知為什麼，


What we want to talk about is Asian policies. As far as I know, Danny Russell
and I are in concurrence on a lot of these issues. But I don’t know about
further up in the Administration. So when I ask questions, for some reason, the
State Department // I am going to ask you a question now, for example, as I
mentioned in my opening statement, I strongly believe that Taiwan should be
included in the Trans Pacific Partnership. Does the US Government support
Taiwan’s inclusion in the TPP? That’s my question to you. Can you speak on
behalf of the Administration here?

我們要談談什麼是亞洲的政策。據我所知，丹尼· 羅素和我是同意了很多這些問題。但我
不知道[羅素的]上司的看法是如何。所以，當我問問題，不知道是為了什麼原因，美國國
務院…[自己打斷]//我要問你一個問題，例如，正如我在開幕發言中提到的，我堅信台灣
應包括在TPP裡。美國政府可支持台灣納入TPP嗎？這是我給你的問題。你能代表政府說話
嗎？

莫伊

Thank you very much. I do appreciate your comments and I did have a chance to
speak to Danny Russell before coming up, and he wanted me to pass on his
regrets and appreciation for setting up this meeting. I can say that, from our
part, I don’t think that there’s anything preventing us from talking about
Taiwan issues here.



羅伊斯

It’s not just Taiwan. If Subcommittee Chairman Chabot was not equally
concerned and disappointed about it, has he not brought it up with the
Secretary of State here yesterday, I probably would not have brought it up. But
it’s just a pattern that, at this point, to us, the Asian Pacific region is
vitally important. We spend a lot of time on this issue, and we want the
Administration to be equally engaged on this. (So if you will carry that
information back.) But again, particularly given Taiwan’s almost singular
reliance on cross strait trade, does the US government support the inclusion of
Taiwan in the TPP?



莫伊

I will relay your concerns to my colleagues. It certainly isn’t a statement
about our commitment to a strong US-Taiwan unofficial relations. In fact, I
think we have a very strong record, and I think we have a very good story to
tell about that. With regard to your question about TPP, we welcome Taiwan’s
interest in it. We’ve heard from them very recently about their interest. We
also welcome (and I think that you met with President Ma Ing-Jeou on your
recent Congressional Delegation) [President Ma’s] steps to liberalize Taiwan’
s economy.



As you know, we are in ongoing negotiations on TPP, and I think what I can say
about this is that perhaps it is best if we move towards conclusions on those
negotiations before we discuss additional membership. But I think that we are
taking a step by step approach here. We have heard from Taiwan as well as
others about interests in TPP, and we certainly welcome that interest and we
are definitely willing to consider, along with some countries that approach us
most recently. We are willing to discuss about TPP in the future.



羅伊斯

One of the most important aspects of the TPP beyond the important trade-related
benefits, is that the grouping will help shape East Asia’s multi-lateral
political architecture by firmly anchoring nation states in a binding, legal
agreement. I want to make certain that Taiwan is part of that agreement. I
think it’s critical to Taiwan that it be included not only because it’s in
one of the world’s top 20 economies, but also because it is in our own
strategic interest, and adding Taiwan to TPP will allow it a greater access to
other trade agreements with Europe, for example. It’s going to serve as a
strong symbol of American support, and that is why I strongly support this.



There is another issue that I want to talk about, and that is the issue about
the F16 upgrades. Does the US remain fully committed to Taiwan’s F16 upgrade
program?

還有就是我想談另一個問題，那就是關於F16的升級的問題。請問美國會繼續投入台灣的F
16的升級方案嗎？

莫伊

Back to TPP. What we would encourage Taiwan to do, as you know, TPP is a
consensus , tight membership. We would encourage Taiwan to raise its interest
in membership with all of the other parties as well. I know that Congressman
Engel also raised his concerns about the issue of the CAPE’s program. As I
understand, the US Air Force’s funding for the CAPE’s program will continue
through 2014. The US Air Force F-16 program office has determined the lack of
US Air Force participation beyond the fiscal year 2014 will not have a
significant impact on the Taiwan program. And that all funding can be covered
in Taiwan’s current letter of offer and acceptance. As a result, potential
cuts in the US Air Force’s funding program in the CAPE’s program will not
negatively impact Taiwan’s F16 retrofit program.


軍對CAPE計劃的任何可能資助的削減，將不會產生不利台灣F16改造方案的影響。

We certainly are committed to the F16 retrofit program.  I think that we have
demonstrated that and we certainly had discussions with Taiwan.

我認為我們已經證明我們致力於F16的改造方案。，我們當然與台灣討論過了。

羅伊斯

It’s discouraging to me and others because many of us here, including myself,
wrote you and talked to the Administration about the sale of new F16s. So now
we are talking about retrofit. We want to make certain that this goes forward.
I would suggest the sale of the new F16s would be an easy solution to this. I
strongly support this.



恩格爾

The Taiwan Defense Ministry now faces a tough decision on how to move forward
with the upgrade of its F16 fighters at a reasonable cost. This is an upgrade
that it desperately needs. Maybe they will continue it, maybe they won’t. I am
concerned about Taiwan being able to maintain their fleet of F16s, and
certainly, the decision that the USAF made not to fund the CAPES program was a
poor decision—it just makes no sense to me whatsoever. When it comes to Taiwan
, there is a sort of undercurrent that we feel over time. We bend over
backwards to try not to upset the sensitivity of the Beijing regime. And
frankly it irks me.



Not that I don’t wish to have good relations with Beijing—we should—but not
at the expense of our relations with Taiwan, or not at the expense of our
friendship with Taiwan. So it really irritates me that we make a decision that
has an adverse impact on our friend Taiwan. Doesn’t seem to be for any good
policy purpose other than to placate Beijing.



莫伊

…I regret that I am not able to speak for my colleagues in the Air Force. I do
understand your concerns, and I will relay those to my colleagues. But what I
do want to do is to strongly emphasize that our improvement in the bilateral
relations with the PRC does not come at the expense of our relationship with
Taiwan. In fact, I think that our relationship with Taiwan, right now, is as
strong as it ever has been. We have often times emphasized that point, that we
have an interest in strengthening relations with Beijing, but absolutely not at
the expense of our very strong relationship with Taiwan and the people on
Taiwan.



恩格爾

I certainly hope that continues to be the case, because sometimes it appears
that it’s not really the case. I’ll take your word, but want you to duly note
that we here at this committee feel strongly about this. What steps is the
Administration taking to ensure that Taiwan is accorded in an appropriate level
of participation in the international organizations such as the WHO and ICAO? (
32:59)

我當然希望是這樣子，因為有時候好像不是真的如此。我相信你所說的，但是我要你正式
注意，我們本委員會強烈地感覺這一點。[請問]白宮政府採取了哪些措施，以確保台灣被
給予適當地參與權，可以參與國際組織，如世界衛生組織和國際民航組織？

莫伊

…As I said in my introductory remarks, it’s an area of primary importance to
us; it is a priority that the expertise from Taiwan is recognized. There is so
much professional expertise there, so much knowledge in Taiwan that it deserves
to be recognized in the international organizations. This is not just a matter
of knowledge, however; it is a matter of dignity too. And we take it very
seriously. So we do review different opportunities to expand. You have noted
ICAO and working together with a number of other countries. We have supported
not just Taiwan’s guest participation as it appears as a guest last year at
the Assembly, but more frequent interaction with ICAO, because there is a lot
of technical expertise they can bring to those types of meetings. (34:18)


合作。我們不只有支持台灣以嘉賓的身份參與，像他們去年在[世界衛生]大會一樣，但也

working on climate change issues, various types of international organizations
we often consult because there are often times when there are issues where
Taiwan has a unique ability to revive (34:32) knowledge, recommendations,
imaginative ideas beyond just their technical expertise, and we want to take
advantage of that and we want to continue to do that. (34:52)



恩格爾

Is the Administration providing Taiwan the defensive weapons that it requires
as required by the TRA, are there defensive systems that Taiwan has requested
but we have decided not to provide, and if so, what are they? (35:14)

政府究竟有沒有按照台灣關係法提供台灣所要求的防禦性武器？ 有沒有什麼台灣已要求，
但我們已決定不提供給他們的防禦系統？如果有的話，它們是什麼？

莫伊 35:15

I am not aware of such systems. But we are in compliance with the TRA in making
available to Taiwan the defense articles and services necessary to enable
Taiwan to maintain sufficient self-defense capabilities. We will continue to be
in compliance with that. The US Government often review their defense
capabilities, and I think we have a very strong record in this Administration
of providing that.



萊赫蒂寧 (佛羅里達州; 原董事長; Ms. Ros-Lehtinen) (36:11)

Relations between the US and Taiwan are at a critical juncture. I am concerned,
as all of us are, that China’s continued rise in aggression in the East and
South China Seas, and the feeble response by our State Department to North
Korea’s missile launches, which are clear violation of international sanctions
 The people of Taiwan have every reason to fear developments of the West
Pacific to worry about the future of their land and to question, both the
resolve and the commitment of the US. (How tragic). And as we approach the 35th
anniversary of this very important and essential TRA anniversary, we remember
that this crucial legislation forms the cornerstone of US-Taiwan relations. It
is the foundation of policy that has been and will be, and will remain
forevermore the anchor of peace and security of the West Pacific.



But as we reflect on the promise of the TRA on this 35th anniversary, we must
also gage the fulfillment of its specific policies, and we examine the lack of
strategic vision in this part of the world and we talk about where we go from
here, when we, over here, watch China, again, increases its defense budget by
double digits, begin construction on a second aircraft carrier, establish air
defense identification zone in the East China Sea and continue its aggression
over the Senkaku Island. There is no better time to reaffirm, to clarify, and
to strengthen the relations with our democratic ally and our strongest friend,
Taiwan. But instead of recommitting to Taiwan, we continue to hear our State
Department speak in half-truths, invent a laundry list of items that hinders
our relations with Taiwan and our Pacific allies, and do everything it can to
not provoke China.




And that sadly seems to be our policy with Taiwan: don’t antagonize China.
Taiwan Policy Act introduced by my colleagues and Chairs of the Taiwan Caucus
and me, passed down to this committee last August, the bill aims to rectify
these problems by advancing the sale of essential defense articles and the new
sale of F16s is included in this bill. It encourages high level of visits
between the US and Taiwan officials; it promotes bilateral trade agreements.
What is the Administration’s policy on the TPA, and secondly, how does the
Administration plan to counterbalance China’s power, when we don’t even
commit to our democratic ally, Taiwan, and by extension, any of our regional
allies, and thirdly, what is the Administration going to do to develop Taiwan’
s economic bonds with the US—its independence, its strengthen our economic
bonds.  What is the State Department, the Obama Administration’s policy on
Taiwan—other than don’t make China mad?



莫伊40:00

I don’t think that our Taiwan policy is founded on the principle of “let’s
not make China mad”. In fact, I think that if you look at the record, we have
done an enormous amount to expand our relationships to strengthen it, in all
areas, not just the security aspects of it; the economics’ side. It’s also
the people to people side as well. As you may know, with the help of the others
, we granted Taiwan…(interrupted by Ros-Lehtinen)



萊赫蒂寧 (40:40)

Have you read the Taiwan Policy Act we have filed? If not, I would like to give
that to you and have an Administration policy on it. How are we
counterbalancing China’s power and committing to Taiwan?

你有沒有看過我們提出的台灣政策法案？如果沒有，我想把它給你(們)，並請白宮當局把
有關它的政策給個交代。我們要如何制衡中國的力量，並致效於台灣？

莫伊

I think that, of course I am very pleased to take a look with my colleagues at
the legislation, but I think we have a very strong record of support for Taiwan
through our unofficial relations in accordance with the TRA. As I noted, the 35
th anniversary is a reason to celebrate; it’s a reason also to commemorate
just how we’ve come what we need to do in the future we can still refine and
enhance…(interrupted by Ros-Lehtinen)



萊赫蒂寧

I don’t believe that the people of Taiwan share those sentiments. I don’t
think they see us as upholding the principles enshrined in the cornerstone of
our US’s foreign policy related to Taiwan, which is the TRA. It promises a lot
, and I think the people of Taiwan would think that we haven’t fulfilled those
missions. Do you think that we have?



莫伊 (42:02)

I do believe—I mean, I haven’t seen any recent polls—but I would imagine
that the people on Taiwan regard the US relationship as, if not the most
important relationship for Taiwan, it is got to be right up there. They are
good friends of ours; they think like we do. Their values we share, I would
think that they are very supportive of the things that we have done.



萊赫蒂寧

Do you think that we need to do more? 你認為我們需要做的更多嗎？

莫伊

We are always looking for ways to strengthen the relations, just as we are
looking in the larger context in our rebalanced Asia. We want to strengthen our
relationships with our allies; we want to strengthen our relationships with...

我們一直都有在尋找各種方法來加強關係，就像我們有在尋找重新平衡亞洲的多方面的背
景。我們要加強我們與我們的盟國的關係，我們希望加強與…的關係...[被打斷]

萊赫蒂寧

New sales of F16s and higher technologies of planes for the needs of Taiwan?

那銷售台灣需要的新的F16和較高技術的飛機呢？

莫伊

Again, we have had a very strong record of providing defense articles to Taiwan
 再次，我們有非常好的紀錄提供防衛武器給台灣。

謝爾曼

One issue we brought up with President Ma was the incarceration of the former
President Chen. One of the red flags of a democracy that it isn’t working real
well is that the former president is in jail. That is true in just about any
country. What are we doing to seek either the humane treatment or the
humanitarian parole for the former President Chen?



莫伊 (43:58)

As you know, the former president was convicted on corruption charges after his
2008 presidency, including the transfer of presidential office funds to private
Swiss bank accounts. We believe that his conviction was in a system that is
fair, impartial and transparent. Rule of law exists in Taiwan. In regard to
your specific question, certainly we have heard varying accounts of the status
of his health, and certainly we would want Taiwan to review his health
condition. I am not aware of any or I don’t have an update …



謝爾曼

Let me go on to the next question. Taiwan is spending only half as much of GDP
on defense as we are, I don’t mind going to my district and say, Let’s pay
taxes, but Taiwan is on the front lines. I am sure you’ve had discussions when
they say they can’t afford to spend anymore. We are all very concerned about
the maintenance of their F16 aircrafts. The US taxpayers may not be able to pay
for that. Taiwan has only a 5% value added tax. Has the US pushed Taiwan not
just to spend more on its defense, but if they say they don’t have the money
to make its value added tax or other taxes at the rate of our European allies
who we also push to pay for their own defense?



莫伊 (45:55)

On the issue of spending more, we have encouraged Taiwan to fulfill what it has
said in the past that it will spend up to 3% of their GDP on defense.



Why do we accept 3% for them and including veteran benefits, 5% for us?

為什麼他們只要3％，而且這還包括退伍軍人的福利，然而我們則要5％呢？

莫伊

This is what President Ma has stated in the past, and so we do hope that  [
interrupted]

這是馬總統在過去表示過的，所以我們也希望[被對方打斷]


謝爾曼

I think the best way to get the 3% is to start demanding 6%, or insisting that
a good ally that seeks our support for a country that faces possible
eradication or forced incorporation ought to be doing well more than the US per
capita, and I think if we start to talk about the 6% then we may someday see 3
or 4% at the minimum. Finally, what are we doing to push Taiwan to adopt better
laws against the peer to peer websites for piracy movies?




莫伊47:07

I think that this is part of our economic engagement with Taiwan. What we’ve
had said in the past, and this is in terms of all our dialogues, we would like
to have a little bit more confidence, especially in areas such as intellectual
property protection…[interrupted]

我認為這是我們與台灣的的經濟交往的一部分。我們過去在我們所有的對話方面已經說過
，我們希望能有一點點多的信心，特別是在諸如知識產權保護領域...[被對方打斷]

謝爾曼

But are we specifically focusing on peer-to-peer websites, the lack of
legislation in that area, and the pirating of our movies?

但是，我們可有特別注重對等網站，台灣缺少這方面的立法，以及盜版我們的電影？

莫伊

I am not aware of…(both speaking at once)…Intellectual property protection
definitely is a priority of ours…

我不知道......（兩人同時說）......知識產權保護絕對是我們的首要任務......

謝爾曼

A general statement about intellectual property protection won’t have the
specific effect or may have no effect, compared to the specificity, and I hope
that you will specifically focus their attention on the peer-to-peer website
piracy of our movies. Finally, what steps is the Administration taking to make
sure that Taiwan has appropriate participation in international organizations,
such as WHO, ICAO, and the climate control (UNFCCC—UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change)?



莫伊

As I noted earlier, international space is a priority of ours, and we are
looking for opportunities for Taiwan experts and professionals to shine in
their fields in international flora. We will continue to do that. That really
does help those organizations; it really helps the global community when they
participate.

正如我前面提到的，[台灣的]國際空間是我們的優先任務。我們正在尋找給台灣的專家和
專業人士在他們的領域上發揮表現在國際的舞台的機會。我們將會繼續這樣做。這確實可
以幫助這些組織：當台灣參與時，他們確實有助於國際社會。

史密斯 (新澤西; 共和黨) (Mr. Smith) (49:04)

Over the past few years and across two different administrations, we have
witnessed an alarming number of gushing statements by senior American officials
on the US’s One-China Policy. Last year, PLA (People’s Liberation Army)’s
General Chen Bingde, during a visit to Washington, claimed that the then
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that the US policy maintains that “
there is only one China in the world”, and that “Taiwan is part of China.”
Not long after that, Admiral Mullen shared the view that “peaceful unification
of China”.



Let me ask you, the People’s Republic of China, as we all know, is a
dictatorship; it is a gulag state and would we have wished that reunification
of West Germany into East Germany when Honecker was ruling as a cruel dictator
in East Germany? I think not. So I think those kinds of statements are not
helpful. I do believe, and I want to ask your view on this, as to whether the
time has come for the Cold War relic, and I know all about the Shanghai
Communique, I’ve read it, and I’ve actually had an argument with Li Peng in
China, when we brought up the human rights [issues], and he said that the
Shanghai Communique said nothing about the human rights at all. That was true,
but he used it as a dodge and as a way of precluding any discussion on human
rights. But shouldn’t we have a One-China, One-Taiwan policy?



And secondly, if you could, the Taiwan Relations Act Section 2 points out that
the “enactment of this Act is necessary to help maintain the peace, security
and stability in the Western Pacific”. What are the consequences of the US if
Taiwan were to come under PRC control, and do we fully realize that such a
shift would have devastating implications for US’s long standing security
partners and allies of East Asia including Japan and South Korea?



莫伊 (51:08)

What I’d like to point to is most recently, as you may probably have seen in
the press that there has been more dialogue between the two sides of the Strait
recently, the head of the Mainland Affairs Council of Taiwan Wang Yu-Chi with
Zhang Zhe-Jun, head of the Taiwan Office. We have gone on record as saying that
we support that kind of warming of ties. And I think that one of the reasons
why there has been such discussions is that we have been so supportive of
Taiwan, giving them the confidence, so they can have this kinds of dialogue. So
I think we do have a very strong record of that. We do support the increased
dialogue between the two sides. In terms of consequences, I wouldn’t want to
get into any sort of hypothetical scenarios here. I don’t think that that is
something that we view as very likely right now.



史密斯

What happens? We do have scenarios that we consider at the Pentagon and at the
State.

會怎麼樣？五角大廈和國務院也有假設不同的情景過。

莫伊

It’s not something that is sort of a normal feature of our discussions, these
types of hypotheticals. What I can say is that I heard your remarks about the
One-China Policy. But this is a policy that has endured through many
administrations and…I think that what we have done, and much of this has to do
with the TRA but it has given Taiwan a great deal of confidence over the last
years to increase the kind of intensity of discussions with the PRC, knowing
that the US is always in support is greatly comforting to the Taiwan side.



史密斯

But frankly, some of our diplomats including our former Ambassador Bellocchi
has suggested that the ambiguity and the statements that may have made could
send the wrong signal to the PRC, particularly as they build up militarily in
and around or in proximity to Taiwan. And with the saber rattling we see
occurring in the South China Sea and an ever expansive foreign policy, the
ugliness towards Japan coming out of Beijing, the useful diplomatic affection,
perhaps it was useful for a while, seems to me that it could inadvertently lead
to miscalculations by Beijing about what happens if they take Taiwan.


佔取台灣，北京可能會無意中誤判。

莫伊 (54:34)

I don’t think that Beijing questions US resolve on the Taiwan issue. We
continue to be extremely supportive and we continue to expand our unofficial
relations and that I think does a great deal to help strengthen and to allow
for a more peaceful and stable environment across the Strait.

我不認為北京有質疑美國對台灣問題的決心。我們仍然是非常支持台灣的，我們也照常擴
大我們的非官方關係，我認為，因此對和平跟穩定兩岸的環境做了很大的幫助和加強。

洛文塔爾 (加州; 民主黨) (Mr. Lowenthal) (55:05)

I have a one statement before I ask any questions that echoes the Chair’s
comments. I recently visited Taiwan and met with many government officials, and
I found it very very educational and I too believe very strongly that the State
Department and the Government should understand the importance of Taiwan being
a part of the TPP. And I think that should be a message back. So before I ask a
question, many of us think strongly believe that we should do whatever we can
to encourage that kind of development.



When I was there, I was very impressed with the cross strait dialogue that was
going on between Taiwan and the PRC. I would like to know what is our State
Department’s involvement in that dialogue between Taiwan [and China]. How can
we be helpful in promoting engagement between China and Taiwan? It seems to me
that President Ma was very proud of the agreements that already had been made,
especially the trade agreement, the increased tourism that was going on, the
increased flights that were going on between. What are our involvement in that
has been? The second question is, what is your perspective on the current and
forthcoming political situation in Taiwan, including the 2016 presidential
election in which President Ma will be turned down. How will that affect the
cross-strait relationships; will that be one of the defining characteristics in
terms of that election?

當我在那裡時，我對台灣與中國之間正在進行的兩岸對話有很深刻的印象。我想知道我們
的國務院對台灣[與中國]之間的對話有什麼參與。我們怎樣才能幫助促進中國和台灣之間


莫伊(57:09)

In terms of cross strait dialogue, we don’t play a direct role. They’ve had
direct talks. In fact, the dialogue that I was referring to between Wang Yu-Chi
and Zhang Zhe Zhen, was really the first time in 60 years of such a discussion
…What we have done is we have given Taiwan a great deal of confidence, through
our policies and through our direct assistance and that has enabled them to
have more engagement across the strait. We believe that more engagements,
especially if it’s at a pace that is consistent with the aspirations of the
people on Taiwan, for people of both sides of the Strait, we would very much
support that, because we believe that creates a more stable and peaceful
environment, but it does have to come at a pace that the people on Taiwan feel
comfortable with.



In terms of the upcoming election, we don’t speculate on how that’s going to
affect cross strait relations but it’s a good time to highlight how we have
been and still are on the thriving democracy that exists in Taiwan. It is
really remarkable. Just personally…the first time I went to Taiwan was in
1978. You just cannot imagine the change that’s taking place there. Mr.
Chairman, when you go to Taiwan, it just highlights the kind of values that
they share with us. You know very well that it is this kind of energetic kind
of democracy that exists there and so I won’t speculate; we don’t get
involved in their domestic policies and how that is going to play out in terms
of the cross-strait policy in the future. But it is really a good time to
celebrate; it is a remarkable story in Asia—the democracy that exists in
Taiwan.



夏波 (俄亥; 共和黨) (Mr. Chabot) 59:30

I would like to personally thank Mr. Sherman for raising the issue of President
Chen, which he did strongly when we were on the Co Del (Congressional
Delegation) recently in Taiwan. Prior to that trip, I’ve been there about a
year ago, with another of my Democratic colleagues, the ranking member of the
Asia Pacific Committee, Eni Faleomavaega. And on that particular Co Del, Eni
and I went down to the prison where President Chen is being held. He has been
there going on five years now. You are correct, there is conviction for
corruption charges. We understand that completely. There’s a whole lot of
aspects of that which we can discuss in great detail. For example, there is an
argument that there was a judge that was more favorable to him that was
replaced by a judge who was less favorable. There are all kinds of stories that
you hear; I don’t want to go to all the details about that.




But the fact is that he has been in prison now for going on five years. I’ve
read the medical reports; I’ve talked to the doctors who have examined him. I
have seen him with my own eyes. I have met with him many times when he was the
President of Taiwan. He is the second democratically elected president, served
for eight years. And I think Mr. Sherman is absolutely right when he says that
there is something wrong when one administration comes in, and the previous
administration is in prison. Something is not right. I’ve seen, again, with my
own eyes. The man has Parkinson’s; he shakes constantly; he’s got
cardiovascular problems, depression, a whole range of things. We’ve talked to
President Ma and others about it, and I believe that medical parole, as Mr.
Sherman mentioned, is a logical Chen medical parole. We are not saying that he
’d be free, but at least he can go home to his family for whatever years that
he has left.



莫伊(1:59:59)

As I noted earlier, we have the confidence in the fairness and the impartiality
and transparency in Taiwan’s judicial system. And we have made clear to Taiwan
our expectation that procedures governing the terms of Chen Shui-Bian’s
imprisonment and access to health care will be transparent, fair, and impartial
, and so if there are occasions, and this is just a general statement from the
US Government, when there are cases, when there are such health concerns, we
would…make note of that to, in this case, the Taiwan Authorities, but other
governments as well, when there may be some humanitarian considerations that
could be made. But certainly, we believe that the original case was tried [
interrupted]



夏波

I am not talking about the original case; I am talking about NOW. Still that
was an excellent answer. But my question is, does the Administration have a
position on medical parole? Well, is there a position? You said he ought to be
treated humanely in prison; we are saying that he shouldn’t be in prison at
this point in time. He has been in prison; he is there now. We are saying that
medical parole should be granted…Do you have a position on that? Should he be
granted? If you don’t have one, that’s okay. But I just would like to know.


果你沒有立場的話，那也沒關係。但我只是想知道。

莫伊 (1:03:30)

I don’t think we take the position [interrupted]

我不認為我們採取的立場[被對方打斷]

夏波

Okay. All right. Thank you. That was my question. I will ask you another
position if you have this. The President, the Vice President, the Defense
Minister and the Foreign Minister [of Taiwan] can’t come to Washington, D.C.
We want to meet with them, we have to go to San Francisco, or Baltimore, or [
somewhere]; they are not allowed to come to the capital of the United States,
which I think is a travesty for a close ally of the US. We have introduced
legislatures innumerable times to dump that policy, which I think is unfair to
Taiwan. Does the Administration have a position on that?


准來美國的首都，是很滑稽的事。我們提出了無數次的提議來除掉這個我認為對台灣不公
平的政策。。政府對這的立場是什麼？

莫伊(1:04:25)

We continue to have our One-China Policy that is set forth in the Three Joint
Communiques…[interrupted]

載於三個聯合公報，我們持續有一中政策...[被對方打斷]

夏波

I am aware of that. Do you have a position on whether they should come here?

我知道這一點。你對他們是否應該來這裡的立場是什麼？

莫伊

In terms of the travel of Taiwan Authorities that is consistent with those
policies—our One-China Policy … [interrupted]

在台灣當局的行程是與我們的一中政策是一致的...[被對方打斷]

夏波

So you believe we should continue the President, the Vice-President, the
Foreign Minister—so they should not be able to come to Washington, D.C.?

所以，你認為我們應該繼續讓台灣的總統，副總統，外交部長，不能來到華盛頓特區？

莫伊

I think our policy has been very consistent over a number of administrations [
interrupted by “I am asking for an answer of yes or no”] and I believe that
we will continue.

我認為，過了那麼多的當局，我們的政策一直都很一致。[被夏波打斷: “我要求的是一個
答案：有或沒有？”]
我相信，我們將繼續…[被打斷]。

夏波

So you are saying that they are not to be allowed to come here; continue with
that policy. We are saying that we should change that policy. You say stick
with it.

所以，你是說他們是不被允許來到這裡，繼續該政策。我們則說，我們應該改變這一政策
。你說堅持下去。

莫伊

I say that our policy has been consistent and I believe we will be consistent
in the future.

我說，我們的政策是一貫的，而我相信我們將來也是會繼續下去。

康諾利 (維吉尼亞州; 民主黨) (Mr. Connolly) (1:06:12)

Briefly, what, in your opinion, or the Administration’s opinion, does the TRA
commit United States to do with respect to the military relationships with
Taiwan?

簡單地告訴我，在你看來，或是以政府的意見，有關與台灣的軍事關係，台灣關係法的宗
旨要美國做的究竟是什麼？

莫伊

As noted earlier, we are obligated to make available to Taiwan defense articles
and defense services that are necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a
sufficient self-defense capability. It is an obligation that we don’t shirk
these obligations. The needs of Taiwan are under constant review.

正如前面提到的，我們有責任提供給台灣需要的國防物品和防禦服務，使台灣能維持足夠
的自衛能力。這是我們不可推卸的責任，一種義務。台灣的需求是經常經過檢討的。

康諾利

Good. I would agree with you. Would you also agree that something Beijing doesn
’t understand is that big stick of Teddy Roosevelt. We can talk softly, but
they got to also know that we also carry a big stick, and that we mean it, that
we keep our commitments, and that whatever happens, ultimately, in the Taiwan
Strait will happen peacefully. It is not going to happen by military force, and
the US is prepared to make sure that it doesn’t happen by military force. You
think, especially in light of Chinese behavior, in the [Senkaku?] Islands
throughout the Pacific Rim that that message is maybe more important than ever
from the US with respect to Taiwan?



莫伊 (1:07:55)

As I noted earlier, I don’t think that the PRC doubts our resolve, our
continued positive presence in the East Asia Pacific region [interrupted by “
Really? With respect to Taiwan?”] Absolutely.

正如我前面提到的，我不認為中國會懷疑我們的決心，我們在東亞太平洋地區繼續存在正[
被對方打斷: “真的？有關台灣的決心呢?”] 當然可以。

康諾利 (1:08:08)

United States, in 2001, tentatively agreed to sell diesel submarines to Taiwan.
Thirteen years later, where are we in the submarine sale?

美國在2001年，初步同意出售柴油潛水艇給台灣。十三年後的今天，這個買賣有什麼進展
？

莫伊 (1:08:18)

As you know, we continue to review the defense needs and we make decisions that
are appropriate [interrupted]

如你所知，我們繼續檢討台灣的國防需要，我們做出適當的決定[被對方打斷]

康諾利

Have we sold a single one of those diesel submarines to Taiwan13 years later?

我們13年後可有售出一艘柴油潛水艇給台灣？

莫伊

I am not aware of that, sir.

我不知道。

康諾利

Did, by any chance, Beijing object to that sale?

北京可有反對這個銷售？

莫伊

We don’t discuss arms sales of defense…

我們不討論國防軍售...

康諾利

Did they express themselves either publicly or through private channels that
you are aware of?

北京到底有沒有？用公開表達或透過私人管道的方式？

莫伊

I am not aware of…

我不知道...

康諾利

So why the hang up? Why not sell the diesels then?

那麼，為什麼沒有賣？

莫伊

Again, we make decisions not with the PRC in mind. We make those decisions
based on what we feel are our needs.

再次的，我們做我們的決定，心中不記掛著中國。我們根據我們的感覺需要什麼，而作我
們的這些決定。

康諾利

Oh. So the decision tentatively to sell submarines to Taiwan in 2001 is still
under consideration as to whether it meets your definition of our appropriate
defense for Taiwan.

喔。所以，在2001年出售潛艇給台灣的初步決定，其實是仍在考慮，這是否符合你對可以
適合防禦台灣的定義之中。

莫伊

There are a range of systems, there are a range of different packages that we
constantly…[interrupted]

有一系列的系統中，有一系列不同的組合，我們不斷的...[被打斷]

康諾利

What about F16s? The Congress has repeatedly said the sale of F16s makes sense
to us. Is that all under review for whether it is appropriate part for the
defense of Taiwan?

那F16怎麼樣？國會已多次表示，出售F16是有意義的。這是否也還在檢討中，看這是否適
宜台灣的防衛的一部分？

莫伊

We’ve made the determination that the F16 retrofit…was the most appropriate
type of weapon systems to sell to Taiwan and we continue to believe that that
is the case.

我們已經決定改造的F16...是賣給台灣最合適的武器系統。我們也繼續認為這個決定是對
的。

康諾利

What about the military exercises? Any considerations to include Taiwan, for
example, in RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific Exercise)?

那麼軍事演習呢？可有任何考慮，例如環太平洋演習包括台灣？

莫伊 (1:10:08)

We always consider, and this is our policy worldwide, we are always considering
different participants. I am not aware of such consideration, but I think my
colleagues in the Defense Department can better address that.

我們的世界性的政策始終都有一直在考慮不同的參與者。我不知道有或無這樣的考慮，但
我認為我在國防部的同事可以更好回答這個問題。

康諾利

We don’t want to ever be provocative, but we need to stand by our alliances.
We want a good, productive relationship, it seems to me, with the PRC, but I
also know from history, that Beijing respects strength, peace through strength,
and our commitment to Taiwan is an extraordinary test case, and it seems to me
that we have to follow through on our commitments with respect to Taiwan.
Beijing doesn’t have to like it, but it will have to respect it.



韋伯 (德州; 共和黨) (Mr. Weber) 1:11:10

You said earlier that when you make decisions, that y’all don’t consider
Beijing; you just reaffirmed that with my colleague Mr. Connolly. I think Chris
Smith raised the issue of the One-China Policy. Does it not bother you that
that exists? That there are statements that people have made--high level
officials--have made that agree on the One-China Policy? Does the
Administration not view that as a problem?



莫伊 (1:12:11)

Our One-China Policy is one that existed for several decades now…several
administrations…

我們的一個中國政策已經存在了幾十年了......經過了幾個當局...

韋伯

I’ll take that as a no. So you haven’t sold submarines yet; you don’t take
Beijing into account. People around the world watch us. Words and actions have
consequences. Would you agree that y’all would be okay with a One-Russia
Policy when it comes to Crimea in the Ukraine? Is that akin to the same kind of
ideology?

我把答案當作是“不”。所以，你還沒有賣潛艇、你不考慮北京[的意見]。世界各地的人
們都會看我們。我們的言語和行動都會產生後果。當談到在烏克蘭的克里米亞時，你會同
意一個俄羅斯政策？這是否一種類似的意識形態？

莫伊

I can’t speak to those issues. But again, we are obligate d to provide those
defense materials and services to Taiwan. We have been through several
administrations, I think, vigilant in terms of providing them…

我不能對這些問題發言。但我再說一次，我們有義務來提供這些國防物資和服務給台灣。
我們已經經過幾個當局，都機警的提供…

韋伯

But in view of recent events, wouldn’t you agree that the Administration ought
to be thinking about revamping its policy, that perhaps we would want to get in
gear…[it has been] 13 years [since the talk about the sale of submarines]…has
the world changed in 13 years?

但鑑於最近發生的事件，你難道不同意，政府當局應考慮改造政策的問題？我們是不是應
該考慮上軌道了…已經十三年了…這十三年來世界變了嗎？

莫伊

In what sense, sir? 在哪一方面，先生？

韋伯

How about in your view of the imminent danger of perhaps mainland China…trying
to take back over Taiwan. We’ve said that they are our close friend and ally.
The fact that their officials cannot come to Washington D.C. is a problem.
Events around the world should indicate that now more than ever we need a
stronger relationship with Taiwan. Does the Administration understand the
seriousness? Especially under the recent event of Russia, Ukraine, Crimea…
Things aren’t getting any better, so is there a possibility y’all might step
up the program to sell those defense weapons to Taiwan? Maybe before the next
13 years?



莫伊 (1:14:18)

As I noted, they are under constant review. I take your point about the world
changing to adjust to those changes. Remarkably, as I noted earlier, there is
more dialogue between Taipei and Beijing than there ever has been before.



韋伯

So there is going to be some exercises over Hawaii. Beijing was invited; Taiwan
was not. Why?

那麼，夏威夷有一個軍事演習。北京有被邀請，台灣沒有。為什麼？

莫伊

I think that our policy, in terms of strengthening military-military relations
with Beijing, are fairly apparent. I can defer to my colleagues in the Defense
Department to comment on the status of those relations. But as part of our
rebalance, our consideration of making of strengthening the stability and peace
in East Asia, I think this is a good idea.



韋伯

Okay, obviously, because they weren’t invited. Does this not strike you as odd
that China isn’t as concerned about what we are doing as it seems, words and
actions have consequences. Witness Russia, the recent invasion of Crimea of
Ukraine, so to speak. Does it not strike you as odd that we seem a lot more
worried about Beijing than they are of us? Do y’all take that into account?



莫伊 (1:16:07)

I don’t think that we balance our concerns …we don’t think about it…[
interrupted by “well, that’s obvious”.] But, what I can tell you is that I
think it’s a very smart thing to expand our relations with all countries in
the East Asia and I don’t think that any of this comes at the expense of
Taiwan, and I think that our relationships with Taiwan have been extremely
strong; we will continue to strengthen those relations.



佩里 (賓夕法尼亞; 共和黨) (Mr. Perry) (1:16:56)

I feel like I can’t get a whole lot of straight answers, so I’d like to go to
some kind of yes and no format if I could because it seems to be a lot of time
to just discussing about the fact that the Administration is interested in
talking about or is considering or whatever. Regarding the PLA force build up.
The US analysts assessed that the primary driver of PLA’s force build up is
preparation for conflict over Taiwan status, including contingencies or
possible US intervention. So that’s US analysts. The question is, is this
still the assessment of the Executive Branch? Briefly.



莫伊 (1:17:50)

I am not a spokesperson for our colleagues in the Defense.

我不是在國防部的同事的代言人。

佩里

But I am talking about the Executive Branch. Is this their assessment? Just a
yes or no or I don’t know.

但我說的是行政部門。這是他們的評估嗎？一個是、否、或我不知道就好。

莫伊

Of course we will stand by the assessments that have been made.

我們當然支持已經作出的評估。

佩里

So, the answer is essentially “yes”?

所以，答案基本上“是”？

莫伊

We stand by the reports that we do.

我們支持我們所做的報告。

佩里

Do you know if Taiwan shares the same assessment?

你知道如果台灣也同有所感？

莫伊

Taiwan has taken many precautions in its defense posture—it’s best to ask
them that question, but, certainly, there have been discussions that goes on
about this sort of thing. I would imagine that [interrupted]

台灣已經採取了許多預防措施，所以你最好問他們這個問題。但是，可以肯定的是，對這
一點已經有討論過的了。我想…[被對方打斷]

佩里

You don’t really know. 你也不知道。

莫伊

I can’t speak for Taiwan. 我不能為台灣說話。

佩里

I understand. But in the discussions that the Administration’s had, if that’s
how they are posturing their forces and their strategy based on their
assessment. You don’t know.

我明白了。但是，政府所有的討論中，他們是否根據他們的評估，來定位他們的力量和他
們的戰略討論？你不知道？

莫伊

Is your question whether Taiwan believes it or whether… [interrupted]

你的問題是台灣是否相信它還是...[被對方打斷]

佩里

Yes. Do they share the US’s assessment, if that’s the reason for the build up
.

是。他們可也認同美國的評估，如果這是[解放軍]在加強的原因。

莫伊

I think you would have to ask the Administration.

我想你要問白宮當局。

佩里

Regarding Taiwan’s membership in the TPP. The Administration’s position: for
or against? It’s important for us to know.

關於台灣加入TPP的問題。政府的立場：支持或反對？我們知不知道是很重要的。

莫伊

We welcome their interest. I don’t think the conversations have gone so far as
to be pro or con—we are a long way away from that. But we welcome their
interest.

我們歡迎他們的興趣。我不認為對話已經深得可以決定是贊成或反對—我們還有很長的路
要走。但我們歡迎他們對TPP的興趣。

佩里

I am sure that we do. But you are saying that the Administration hasn’t
decided yet. You are happy for the interest, but you don’t know.

我相信我們會歡迎他們的興趣。但你是說，政府還沒有決定。你喜歡他們的興趣，但是你
不知道[到底是支持或反對]。

莫伊

The issue hasn’t come up to that point yet.

這個問題還沒有拿出來的地步。

佩里

The issue hasn’t been brought up or it isn’t to a point where you can decide
yes or no?

這個問題還沒有被提出來，或者是還沒有到那個你可以決定是或否的地步？

莫伊

It hasn’t come up to the point. We know that Taiwan has expressed some
interest, and we are welcoming that interest. But we are long way away from
discussing that. We have other discussions that we are having on Taiwan’s
economic policies and we are certainly engaged in those, and we are warming our
economic and trade relations with Taiwan.



佩里

Regarding the PRC’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ). What have been
concerns in Taiwan’s response to the PRC’s ADIZ announced in November of 2013
?

關於中國的防空識別區（ADIZ）。 2013年十一月，當中國公佈了這個防空識別區時，有什
麼顧慮到台灣的反應嗎？

莫伊 (1:20:52)

What do you mean by concern? 你是說什麼顧慮？

佩里

The Administration’s concern. Do you have any or are you in agreement?

政府的顧慮。你有什麼顧慮，或者你有同意？

莫伊

I think what’s important here is that President Ma has gone on record as
expressing concern. What he has said in public and what is encouraging is that
he wants a peaceful, stable environment in the region that if there are
disagreements, they should be resolved through dialogue.

我認為這裡最重要的是馬總統已經有記錄表示顧慮。他向公眾所說的，令人鼓舞的，是他
想要在該地區有一個和平，穩定的環境，如果有異議，應通過對話解決。

佩里

Do you know what the response would be if there were an air force or navy
intercept in the ADIZ? If the PLA had intercepted a Taiwanese aircraft or
marine vessels in that area, and there were some incursion, what would some of
our responses be?

你知道如果在防空識別區，有空軍或海軍攔截的話，會有什麼樣的反應嗎？如果解放軍在
該地區截獲台灣飛機或船隻的侵襲，那我們的反應會是什麼？

莫伊

I am not going to get into the speculation or hypothetical situations, but we
have gone on record in response to the announcement of this ADIZ as not
accepting it. So, again, I don’t want to speculate on any kind of possible [
interrupted]

我不打算推測或假設情況，不過，我們在防空識別區公佈時，我們就有記錄的聲明我們不
接受它。所以，再一次，我不想揣測任何一種可能的[被對方打斷]

閉幕詞Closing Statement: 羅伊斯

As you can see there is tremendous bipartisan support for Taiwan and it is my
sincere hope that the Administration would take a more proactive stance on
Taiwan, including working with Taiwan so that it can join the TPP. The Asia
Pacific region is going to witness a significant growth in economics and
prosperity in the next 10 years, and positioning the US, we are, after all, all
on the Pacific Rim, with this opportunity is a task that we take very seriously
on this committee. And as the Chairman of this committee, I’ve made the Asia-
Pacific region a top priority, so I look forward to work closely with the
Administration on this and other issues.


員會的主席，我指定亞太地區為這個委員會的首要任務。我們對待一項任務。所以我期待
著，就這個問題和其他問題，與白宮政府密切合作。

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