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1.媒體來源:
國家利益雜誌 National Interest
（美國的外交雜誌，創立於1985年，文章內容通常比較深入）

2.記者署名
Russel Hsiao

3.完整新聞標題:

Poll: People in Taiwan Feel China is Unfriendly, Prefer Independence, and
Favor Slower Pace of Cross-Strait Exchanges
民調：台灣人民感覺中國不友善，傾向支持獨立，偏好節奏較慢的兩岸互動。

The results of the newest government poll on public views toward China’s
unfriendliness continued a multi-year increase in the number of Taiwanese who
view China as unfriendly.
最新的官方民調顯示，台灣民眾認為中國不友善的比例，延續多年來的趨勢持續上升。

4.完整新聞內文:

以下簡單翻譯，有錯請指正：

Against the backdrop of increasing numbers of Chinese military exercises
around Taiwan, political suppression in neighboring Hong Kong, and aggressive
obstruction of the island democracy’s international space amid the Wuhan
coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19), Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC)—
the cabinet level agency in charge of the country’s cross-Strait policy—
released its latest official opinion polls tracking Taiwanese public opinion
on several key cross-Strait issues. These polls are conducted periodically
and on average three times per year since 2010. In the first official poll
released since the island’s January 2020 presidential and legislative
elections, the latest series of results shows a dramatic increase in the
percentage of people who view China as “unfriendly” (不友善) towards the
Taiwanese government and its people. Amid an escalation of cross-Strait
tension over the past four years, the government agency’s March 2020 poll
indicates that the numbers of people on the island who think China is
unfriendly toward the Taiwan government and the public have risen to 76.6
percent and 61.5 percent, respectively. These figures represent significant
jumps of 7.2 percent and 6.9 percent from the previous poll conducted in
October 2019 and are the highest numbers in 10 years.



The results of the newest government poll on public views toward China’s
unfriendliness continued a multi-year increase in the number of Taiwanese who
view China as unfriendly. This upward trend began in 2016 following Tsai
Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) election as president and the commencement of Beijing’s
multifaceted pressure campaign to isolate the new administration. These
measures include poaching Taiwan’s diplomatic allies; military coercion;
economic coercion; excluding Taiwan from international organizations;
pressuring foreign corporations; pressuring Taiwan’s non-diplomatic allies;
economic incentives; political warfare; cyber espionage; and traditional
espionage. In the poll conducted in March 2016, two months after Tsai was
elected president for her first-term, the numbers were already high at 59.3
percent (government) and 50.6 percent (people), especially when compared to
the last poll taken during the Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) administration in
November 2015, with figures at 51.2 percent (government) and 46.9 percent
(people).


In addition to surveying people’s views on China’s unfriendliness, two
other polls track Taiwanese public opinion on issues such as the people’s
views on unification, independence, or maintaining the status quo (民眾對統一
、獨立或維持現狀的看法) and their views toward the pace of cross-Strait
exchanges (民眾對兩岸交流速度的看法).

此外，另外兩個民調項目是：台灣人民對於統/獨/維持現狀的看法，以及對於兩岸互動的
步調的看法。

In the poll on the public’s view towards unification versus independence,
the March 2020 polls show that 28.1 percent of Taiwanese nationals would
prefer to maintain the status quo and then decide on independence or
unification later (compared to 31.8 percent in March 2016), 26.7 percent
prefer to maintain the status quo and move towards independence (compared to
19.8 percent in March 2016), 23.6 percent prefer the status quo indefinitely
(compared to 26.5 percent in March 2016), 9.3 percent prefer independence
immediately (compared to 6.5 percent in March 2016), and 0.8 percent favor
unification immediately (compared to 1.1 percent in March 2016).

統獨項目中，2020年3月民調顯示28.1%偏好維持現狀、未來再決定統獨（2016年3月數字
為31.8%），26.7%偏好維持現狀並逐步邁向獨立（16年3月數字為19.8%），23.6%偏好長久
維持現狀（16年3月數字為26.5%），9.3%偏好立即獨立（16年3月數字為6.5%），0.8%偏好
立即統一（16年3月數字為1.1%）。

While the percentage of those favoring some form of status quo still
represents the clear majority at 84.4 percent—roughly equivalent to the 86.7
percent polled in March 2016 after Tsai Ing-wen won her first presidential
race—the percentage of those preferring to gradually move towards
independence has noticeably increased by 6.9 percent, while those who want
independence immediately has also increased by 2.8 percent. This shift in
public sentiment has occurred despite the Tsai administration’s repeated
emphasis on maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and Beijing’s
incessant pressure campaign since she was elected president. Therefore, the
increasing preference for independence seems correlated to Beijing’s
intensifying pressure campaign, as well as other events like the ongoing
civil unrest in Hong Kong, which are pushing more people in Taiwan toward
independence from China—even immediately if necessary.



In the polling done on the public’s view on the pace of cross-Strait
exchanges, the March 2020 poll indicates that 45.1 percent feel the current
pace is just right, 26.6 percent think that the pace is too slow, 15.4
percent do not know, and 12.9 percent feel that it is too fast. By
comparison, the March 2016 poll also showed 45.1 percent felt the pace was
then also just right, but 21 percent felt it was too slow, 12.4 percent don’
t know, and 21.5 percent felt that it was too fast at the time.
Interestingly, people who held the view that cross-Strait exchanges were “
too slow” experienced a huge spike following Tsai’s election, jumping to a
high of 45 percent in June 2017, plateauing, and then dropping precipitously
from August 2018 from 42.9 percent to the current 26.6 percent. The cause of
this rise and fall may be attributed to the political shock of the abrupt
halt of cross-Strait exchanges in June 2016, which was followed by General
Secretary Xi Jinping’s hardening stance, increased Chinese military
provocations, the Hong Kong crisis, and the current Wuhan coronavirus
(COVID-19).

兩岸互動步調的項目中，2020年3月民調顯示45.1%認為當前步調剛剛好，26.6%認為太慢，


According to the Central News Agency of Taiwan, another poll also released
reportedly by MAC—which is not yet available on its website—showed that up
to 90 percent of the respondents disagreed with the PRC’s “one country, two
systems” (一國兩制) proposal, 90.5 percent opposed its threat of force
against Taiwan, and 91.5 percent did not agree with its suppression of Taiwan
’s diplomacy. Perhaps most importantly, all the polls seem to show that
mainstream public opinion in Taiwan is dead-set against the CCP ’s negative
attitude toward Taiwan. In another telling demonstration of the factors
shaping Taiwanese public sentiment, 91.6 percent objected to the Chinese
Communist Party’s (CCP) obstruction of Taiwan’s participation in the World
Health Organization (WHO) amid the pandemic. Additionally, 75.2 percent agree
that the government should call on the Beijing authorities to stop political
manipulation in Taiwan by the WHO and co-operate in dialogue.



Since CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping proposed “Xi’s Five Points” (習五點
) of “Exploring Two-Systems – Taiwan Version” (探索兩制台灣方案) on
January 2, 2019 and introduced other hardline measures, polls show that the
percentage of respondents who oppose “one country, two systems” has
significantly risen from 75.4 percent to 90.0 percent. On a more recent
policy matter, 86.4 percent expressed support for President Tsai’s
declaration during her re-election victory speech on January 11, 2020 that
cross-Strait interactions should be promoted on the basis of “peace,
reciprocity, democracy, and dialogue” (和平、對等、民主、對話). Furthermore,
92.1 percent believe that the future of Taiwan and the development of
cross-Strait relations should be determined by Taiwan’s 23 million people in
order to maintain long-term stability.



Perhaps in anticipation of Beijing’s response to the release of the polling
data, the deputy chairman of MAC, Chen Ming-Chi (陳明祺), appealed to Beijing
authorities to “take a rational view of the Taiwan people’s response and
the key foundation of cross-Strait interaction proposed by President Tsai
Ing-wen, and to consider cooperating with Taiwan to deal with issues, health
and pandemic prevention, not political containment.”

陸委會副主席陳明祺呼籲北京當局「理性看待台灣人民的回應及蔡英文提出的兩岸關係基
礎原則，並考慮與台灣合作面對公衛及防疫議題，而非進行政治打壓」。

Despite the CCP’s dual “soft-hard” approach of simultaneously trying to
woo Taiwanese people and businesses through various preferential economic
measures while intensifying its pressure campaign on the government, it is
clear that the enticements have not had the desired effects on Taiwanese
public opinion towards China. Perhaps one reason is that the constituencies
that actually benefit from these measures still represent a minority.
Moreover, as Taiwan’s younger generation becomes more civic-minded and
politically conscious, even those who may financially benefit will not
necessarily be enticed to favor PRC’s authoritarian political system. More
importantly, China’s continued saber-rattling tactics across the Taiwan
Strait, its response to the COVID-19 crisis, and its obstruction of Taiwan’s
entry into international institutions have clearly negatively influenced
Taiwan public opinion towards China. In this context, the emphasis of CCP
Politburo Standing Committee member Wang Yang’s (汪洋, b. 1955) statement at
the “2020 Taiwan Work Conference” earlier this year on raising the
effectiveness of these measures comes to mind. However, it remains to be seen
whether any innovative approaches to genuinely engage Taiwan will come of it,
as China continues to ramp up its military exercises around Taiwan while
attempting to isolate the island nation.



5.完整新聞連結 (或短網址):

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buz...ce-and-favor-slower-pace-cross

https://reurl.cc/xZ1EOZ

6.備註:

在這個全球的對中關係都在發生急劇變化的時刻，
世界各國的政治人物都不是笨蛋，都在密切觀察台灣與中國之間的關係會如何發展；
台灣人要小心，不要在關鍵歷史時刻站錯位置啊！！

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