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美國檢方指控華為 CFO 孟晚舟全文（中英文對照）

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【新唐人2018年12月09日訊】


Summary of Facts

事實摘要

Wanzhou Meng (“Meng”), also known as “Cathy Meng” and “Sabrina Meng,”
is the Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) of Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd.
(Huawei”), a corporation organized under the laws of the People’s Republic
of China (“PRC”) and the world’s largest telecommunications equipment
company. Meng is a citizen of the PRC and a daughter of Huawei’s founder,
Ren Zhengfei. In addition to her role as CFO, Meng currently serves as Huawei
’s Deputy Chairwoman of the Board, and serves or has served in various roles
at other Huawei subsidiaries and affiliates. Meng also served on the board of
Hong Kong-based Skycom Tech Co. Ltd. (“Skycom”) in or about and between
February 2008 and April 2009. According to financial statements for Skycom
for the years 2009 and 2010, the “principal activities of Skycom were
engaged in [sic] investment holding and acting as a contractor for contracts
undertaking [sic] in Iran.”


2010年的財報顯示：Skycom的主要業務是投資控股並擔任與伊朗（簽訂）的合同的承包商
。

According to information obtained through an investigation by U.S.
authorities, including the following, Huawei operated Skycom as an unofficial
subsidiary to conduct business in Iran while concealing Skycom’s link to
Huawei. In this manner and as explained in further detail below, Huawei could
conceal the nature of certain business it was conducting in and related to
Iran, which is generally considered a high-risk jurisdiction.



Former employees of Skycom have stated, in sum and substance, that Skycom was
not distinct from Huawei. For example, Skycom employees had Huawei email
addresses and badges, individuals working in Iran used different sets of
stationery (“Huawei” and “Skycom”) for different business purposes, and
the leadership of Skycom in Iran were Huawei employees;

根據Skycom前僱員的陳述，無論是整體還是細節，Skycom都和華為關係密切。例如，
Skycom的僱員用華為的電郵地址，有華為的徽章。在伊朗工作的人員根據不同的業務需要
使用不同的文具（華為和Skycom都有）。Skycom在伊朗的領導層是華為的僱員；

Documents show that multiple Skycom bank accounts were controlled by Huawei
employees, and Huawei employees were signatories on these accounts between
2007 and 2013;

文件顯示，多個Skycom的銀行賬號是由華為僱員控制的，這些僱員2007-2013年間是賬戶
的簽字人；

Documents and email records show that persons listed as “Managing Directors
” for Skycom were Huawei employees;

文檔和電子郵件的記錄顯示：被列為”Skycom經理”的人員是華為的僱員；

Skycom official documents, including several Memoranda of Understanding, bore
the Huawei logo;

Skycom的官方文件，包括幾份備忘錄，上面有Huawei的商標；

Email correspondence and other records show that all identified Skycom
business was conducted using “@huawei.com” email addresses; and

電郵通信和其它記錄顯示：所有被確認的Skycom的業務使用的都是包含”@huawei.com”
的電郵地址；

Documents show that a purportedly unrelated entity to which Skycom was
supposedly “sold” in 2009 was actually also controlled by Huawei until at
least in or about 2014.

文件顯示：據傳2009年收購了Skycom的一家先前被認為並不相關的實體事實上也是由華為
控制的，直到2014年前後。

Transactional records and other documents obtained by U.S. authorities
further demonstrate that Huawei operated Skycom as an unofficial subsidiary
to conduct business in Iran while concealing Skycom’s link to Huawei. Among
other things, records obtained through the investigation show that Skycom was
used to transact telecommunications business in Iran for major Iranian-based
telecommunications companies.



PROVISIONAL ARREST REQUEST FOR WANZHOU MENG

孟晚舟臨時逮捕請求書

The investigation by U.S. authorities has revealed a conspiracy between and
among Meng and other Huawei representatives to misrepresent to numerous
multinational financial institutions, including a global financial
institution which conducts business in the United States (“Financial
Institution 1”), Huawei’s business practices, particularly Huawei’s
control of Skycom in or about and between 2009 and 2014. Specifically, Meng
and other Huawei representatives repeatedly lied about the nature of the
relationship between Huawei and Skycom and the fact that Skycom operated as
Huawei’s Iran-based affiliate in order to continue to obtain banking
services from multinational financial institutions.



The motivation for these misrepresentations stemmed from Huawei’s need to
move money out of countries that are subject to U.S. or E.U. sanctions –
such as Iran, Syria, or Sudan – through the international banking system. At
various times, both the U.S. and E.U. legal regimes have imposed sanctions
that prohibit the provision of U.S. or E.U. services to Iran, such as banking
services. Of particular relevance, companies such as Huawei operating in
sanctioned countries often need to repatriate income out of those countries
by relying on U.S.-dollar clearing transactions, which typically pass through
the United States, or Euro-clearing transactions, which typically pass
through E.U. countries. Huawei was a customer of Financial Institution 1 and
the other victim institutions, and conducted a significant amount of its
international banking activity, including U.S.-dollar-clearing transactions,
with Financial Institution 1. The financial institutions at issue, including
Financial Institution 1, maintained policies by which they would not onboard
Iran-based clients or process Iran-related transactions through the United
States, so as to avoid exposure to U.S. civil and criminal liability. In
response to due diligence inquiries by the banks regarding these internal
policies, Meng and other Huawei representatives repeated stated that Huawei
did not operate Skycom and that, with respect to Financial Institution 1,
Huawei would not use Financial Institution 1 to process any Iran-related
transactions.



Because Meng and other Huawei representatives misrepresented to Financial
Institution 1 and the other financial institutions about Huawei’s
relationship with Skycom, these victim banking institutions were induced into
carrying out transactions that they otherwise would not have completed. As a
result, they violated the banks’ internal policies, potentially violated
U.S. sanctions laws, and exposed the banks to the risk of fines and
forfeiture. In particular, these relationships included the clearing of
hundreds of millions of U.S.-dollar transactions through correspondent
accounts at financial institutions in Eurozone countries. In essence, these
misrepresentations exposed the financial institutions to serious harm and
denied the institutions the opportunity to make decisions based on the true
risk of processing certain transaction and the reputations risk associated
with banking high-risk clients such as Huawei.



For example, during the relevant timeframe, Financial Institution 1 was under
investigation for U.S. sanctions violations involving Iran and later entered
into a deferred prosecution agreement pertaining to U.S. sanctions violations
involving Iran, and could therefore have suffered criminal consequences for
processing Huawei’s Iran-based transactions.



Relying on the misrepresentations by Meng and other Huawei representatives,
Financial Institution 1 and its U.S. subsidiary cleared more than $100
million worth of transactions related to Skycom through the United States
between approximately 2010 and 2014.

根據孟晚舟和其他華為代表所做的虛假陳述，金融機構1及其美國的子公司在2010-2014年
前後通過美國結算了超過1億美元與Skycom相關的交易。

Many of the misrepresentations at issue were in direct response to a series
of articles published by Reuters describing how Huawei controlled Skycom, and
alleging that Skycom had attempted to import U.S.-manufactured computer
equipment into Iran in violation of U.S. sanctions. One of the Reuters
articles reported that Meng was a member of the board of directors of Skycom
for several years. In statements reported in those Reuters articles, Huawei
denied control of Skycom or violations of law.



According to information obtained from international financial institutions
that conducted business with Huawei, after the Reuters articles were
published, several of them, including Financial Institution 1, asked Huawei
whether the allegations regarding their control of Skycom and business with
Iran made in the Reuters articles were true. In response to those questions,
Huawei employees and executives made a series of misrepresentations, both
publicly and in private communications, with various banking executives,
among other things, denying Huawei’s control of Skycom and claiming Huawei
did not violate U.S. sanctions law.



For example, after the Reuters articles were published, Financial Institution
1 requested that Huawei provide further information and clarification
regarding the relationship of Huawei and Skycom. Although those inquiries
were not addressed to Meng, on or about August 2013, Meng arranged for a
meeting with an executive of Financial Institution 1, and during that
meeting, made a number of misrepresentations to an executive of Financial
Institution 1.


 During that meeting, Meng used an English interpreter and relied on a
PowerPoint presentation written in Chinese. Meng stated that she was using an
interpreter to be precise with her language. After the meeting, an executive
from Financial Institution 1 asked for an English language version of Meng’s
PowerPoint presentation. Meng arranged for hand delivery of the document to
Financial Institution 1 on or about September 3, 2013. The PowerPoint
presentation included numerous untrue or misleading representations regarding
Huawei’s ownership and control of Skycom and Huawei’s compliance with
applicable U.S. laws. For example:



Meng stated that “Huawei operates in Iran in strict compliance with
applicable laws, regulations and sanctions of UN, US and EU,” although
Skycom was using the U.S. financial system to conduct prohibited Iran-related
transactions;

孟晚舟說：”華為在伊朗的運營嚴格遵守了相關法律法規以及聯合國、美國、歐盟的製裁
法案”。儘管事實上Skycom利用美國金融系統進行了嚴令禁止的與伊朗的交易行為。

Meng stated that “Huawei’s engagement with Skycom is normal business
cooperation. Through its trade compliance organization and process, Huawei
requires Skycom to make commitments on observing applicable laws, regulations
and export control requirements.” However, as discussed above, Huawei did
not “cooperate” with Skycom; Skycom was entirely controlled by Huawei;



Meng Stated that “Huawei was once a shareholder of Skycom, and I [Meng] was
once a member of Skycom’s Board of Directors. Holding shares and a BOD
position was meant to better manage our partner and help Skycom to better
comply with relevant managerial requirements.” However, as discussed above,
there were no “Skycom” employees who were managed by Huawei; Skycom
employees were Huawei employees;



Meng stated that “As there was no process or organization at Skycom, Board
supervision was the only way to ensure trade compliance. Holding shares or
assigning Board member could help Huawei to better understand Skycom’s
financial results and business performance, and to strengthen and monitor
Skycom’s compliance.” As discussed above, even while Meng was on the Board,
Huawei did not “monitor” Skycom’s compliance – Skycom’s “employees”
were effectively Huawei employees who used Huawei email addresses.



Meng stated that “Huawei has sold all its shares in Skycom, and I [Meng]
also quit my position on the Skycom Board.” As discussed, that statement was
highly misleading because Huawei sold its shares in Skycom to a company also
controlled by Huawei.

孟晚舟說：”華為已經賣掉了其在Skycom的所有股份，我[孟晚舟]也辭去了董事職位。”
如前文所述，這個聲明極其誤導，因為華為將其在Skycom的股份賣給了一家同樣由華為控
制的公司。

Not only did Meng give this presentation herself, but both the written
presentation and her oral statements to the executive of Financial
Institution 1 refer to Meng in the first person, using the word “I”,
indicating Meng’s personal knowledge of the facts surrounding her statements.

孟晚舟不僅本人做出了相關陳述，而且在書面以及對金融機構1高管的口頭陳述中，都使
用了第一人稱”我”，這表明她本人知曉有關這些陳述的事實情況。

Following Meng’s presentation, several Financial Institution 1 risk
committees relied in part upon Meng’s representations to continue banking
Huawei. For example:

在孟晚舟做出相關陳述后，金融機構1的幾個風險委員會部分基於她的虛假陳述，決定繼
續開展和華為的銀行業務。例如：

A briefing paper from in or about November 2013 stated, “Huawei confirms
that Skycom is a business partner of Huawei and works with Huawei in sales
and services in Iran.” The minutes for the meeting reflect, “Huawei advised
[Financial Institution 1] that its shareholding in Skycom was sold in 2009
and that Cathy Meng (CFO Huawei) resigned her position on the board of Skycom
in April 2009 … [T]he committee agreed to RETAIN the relationship with
Huawei …”



Similar statements are in risk committee briefings from in or about February
2014 and March 2014. All of the committees relied on Meng’s statements, and
none of these committees took adverse action related to the Huawei
relationship with Financial Institution 1.

2014年2-3月前後，風險委員會的簡報中也有類似的聲明。所有委員會都採信了孟晚舟的
聲明，沒有一家委員會就華為與金融機構1的合作關係採取了不利於華為的行動。

An executive at Financial Institution 1 stated that Financial Institution 1’
s risk committee decided to retain Huawei as a client because “Huawei sold
Skycom and the Huawei Chief Financial Officer (CFO) was no longer on the
Skycom board.” The executive further said that, had Huawei not actually sold
Skycom, such a fact would have been “material” to deciding to exit the
client relationship.



On or about April 15, 2015, a Financial Institution 1 reputational risk
committee met in New York City to discuss whether to begin providing banking
services to a Huawei U.S. subsidiary. Meng’s statement about Huawei’s sale
of Skycom was presented to that committee, along with other information. The
committee declined to provide banking services to the Huawei U.S. subsidiary.



The misrepresentations personally made by Meng were part of a broader
conspiracy to misrepresent the relationship between Huawei and Skycom. Other
Huawei employees and representatives made similar misrepresentations to
Financial Institution 1 and to at least three other global financial
institutions. For example, a reputational risk report from one of those
financial institutions states that “Huawei has stated that Skycom is a HK
[Hong Kong] local business partner and has no further affiliation with Huawei.
” Some of these misrepresentations were made, involved, or resulted in
interstate and foreign wire transmissions.



IDENTIFICATION

身份

Wanzhou Meng is a citizen of the People’s Republic of China born on February
13, 1972. She is believed to reside in China. She is traveling to Vancouver,
Canada on Saturday, December 1, 2018, on Cathay Pacific (CX) Flight 838, in
transit to a third country, believed to be Mexico. She is scheduled to arrive
at Vancouver International Airport at approximately 11:30 AM, PST. Meng will
be traveling on a Hong Kong passport bearing passport number KJ0403962. The
photograph attached to the Request for Provisional Arrest was obtained from a
publicly available website for HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES CO. LTD, which represents
the person depicted as Ms. Wanzhou Meng (Sabrina Meng), the Deputy
Chairwoman, and CFO.



BASIS FOR URGENCY

事件緊急

The United States first obtained information regarding Meng’s travel to
Canada on November 29, 2018. U.S. authorities believe, based on the totality
of circumstances, that unless Meng is provisionally arrested in Canada on
Saturday, December 1, 2018, while in transit, it will be extremely difficult,
if not impossible, to secure her presence in the United States for
prosecution. The United States has no extradition treaty with the People’s
Republic of China, and Meng, who is the CFO of one of China’s major
corporate entities and the daughter of its founder, has significant assets at
her disposal. She has the ability to travel and remain outside of the United
States indefinitely.



U.S. authorities believe that after in or about April 2017, Huawei became
aware of a U.S. criminal investigation of Huawei when Huawei’s U.S.
subsidiaries were served with a grand jury subpoena commanding production of,
among other materials, all records of Huawei’s Iran-based business. As a
result, Huawei executives began altering their travel patterns, to avoid any
travel to or through the United States. Specifically, high-level Huawei
executives, including Meng, have ceased traveling to the United States.
Although Meng previously traveled to the United States multiple times in
2014, 2015, and 2016, her last trip to the United States was from late
February through early March 2017. Meng has not come the United States since
then. Moreover, another senior Huawei executive came to the United States at
least four times between 2013 and 2016, and has not traveled to the United
States since then.


2013-2016年間至少4次赴美，但那之後也沒有到訪過美國。

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原文（圖片）參閱地址：


https://zh.scribd.com/document/395187937/Court-documents-for-Wanzhou-Cathy-Meng

——林中虎博客

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──轉自《新世紀》本文只代表作者的觀點和陳述。

（責任編輯：劉明湘）

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