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文章來源：https://bit.ly/35Bysww

作者是美國威爾遜研究中心的研究員Kamil Galeev所發表的推文

(威爾遜研究中心的維基：https://bit.ly/3vt5sSn )

目前為居住在莫斯科的獨立研究者及記者。

之前發表過普丁對少數民族與文化政策的研究文章。

昨天他在推特上發表一篇關於「俄羅斯為何將輸掉這場戰役」的文章，

他不但從許多俄國歷史文化的角度分析兩國之間的關係，

也從近年俄、烏雙方的建軍歷程說明俄、烏兩軍的表現為何如此「出人意料」。

因為這邊是軍事版，所以我就略過歷史的部分，摘要近年俄、烏建軍歷程的相關段落，

，且因時間有限，我直接使用推特的翻譯功能，提供中文對照，

頂多太怪的會順手修一下，如果版友們有任何翻譯建議，也請在推文提供。

如需要看完整文章，請至他個人推特瀏覽。

PS：看到很多版友討論他太早論定輸贏，
    他在這個文章後半部有解釋為何他個人會下這樣的標題。

    下面有板友halfmonster建議標題改為「俄羅斯為何將輸掉這場戰役」
    我也覺得這樣翻譯更符合原文本意，特此感謝。


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一、俄國近年的建軍問題：

Consider a timely paper on Russian army by Bismarck Analysis. It's good &
informative. It's correct on its land-based and artillery-centric character.
It's also correct that Minister of Defence Serdyukov greatly increased army's
efficiency in 2007-2012. But it's still misleading.



(下圖為他所說的分析論文)
https://twitter.com/kamilkazani/status/1497994067019452422/photo/1


Yes, Minister Serdyukov indeed reformed the army. He increased its
efficiency, fought with corrupt and crony armament producers improving the
army supplies. As a result he became extremely unpopular, made tons of
powerful enemies and was ousted in 2012 losing his power and status.




His successor Shoygu knew better than that. Now who's Shoygu? Shoygu is the
*only* single Russian minister who uninterruptedly worked in government since
1991, since the very beginning of Russian Federation. He worked for all
presidents, all prime ministers avoided all purges.



What does it mean? It means he's a cunning political entrepreneur, great in
court politics, publicity, image. You survive every single administration by
maxing your political survival. And to max it you need to minimise animosity.
So you never object to powerful interest groups.



Serdyukov fought with interest groups and was destroyed. Shoygu was smarter
than that. He launched a PR campaign presenting himself as the "saviour" from
the Serdyukov's legacy. Whatever his predecessor did, was  dismantled. Media
cheered, people cheered, interest groups cheered.



That's a very, very typical problem. Efficiency-maxing requires ruthlessness
in dealing with established elites and interest groups. Meanwhile
court-politics-maxing requires pondering to them and not making enemies.
Serdyukov was maxing efficiency, Shoygu - court politics.



There was another issue. Shoygu is ethnic Tuvan. In such a country as Russia
minority member can hardly become the supreme leader. People don't perceive
him as ethnic Russian (see his palace) which means he's not dangerous for the
leader and you can safely delegate him the army.



Shoygy not only purged Serdyukov's appointees, pondered to old military
establishment, stopped arguing with army suppliers about the equipment cost
and quality. He also pondered to numerous feel-good-lies regarding the
Russian big strategy. Let's consider the army vs navy problem.



Army vs navy had been a traditional dilemma of European powers for centuries.
As a rule, you couldn't support both first class army and first class navy,
you had to choose. Some powers ignored this to their demise - like 17-18th cc
France. Others were more rational, like Prussia.



(以下回顧17世紀布蘭登堡到18世紀普魯士建軍的政策，我就先省略，共2段)

So. Land-maxing requires minimising the naval ambition. Does Russia minimise
its naval ambition? No. It feels obliged to maintain as much Soviet naval
legacy as possible. Keep old ships afloat, build new ones, maintain and
expand infrastructure for the ocean navy



Here is another dilemma. Regional fleets can be effectively used in land
wars. For example, Russia declared "navy manoeuvres" and then attacked
Ukraine from the sea. That's cheap and effective. But keeping a regional
fleet doesn't sound sexy. It's efficiency-maxing, not PR-maxing。



And Russia is PR-maxing. Putin declared that the share of new ships should
reach 70% by 2027. Old Soviet ships are becoming obsolete, Russia's building
new ones. BUT. Major Soviet shipyards are located in Ukraine. So now Russia
expands shipyard infrastructure to reach this goal.

俄羅斯正在進行公關最大化。普京宣布，到2027年，新艦船的佔比應達到70%。蘇聯的舊艦船正在
變得過時，俄羅斯正在建造新艦船。但。蘇聯的主要造船廠位於烏克蘭。所以現在俄羅斯
擴大了造船廠基礎設施以實現這一目標。

Soviet naval legacy is a curse of Russian military. USSR could afford ocean
fleets with carrier strike group. Russia can't. But abandoning Soviet
ambitions would require suppressing their own hubris (impossible). So they
strive to maintain it. Ergo: they can't and won't land-max。


(land-max，這詞感謝版友rt3648yth翻譯協助)。

How does it reflect on this war? First, Russian invading force is small. It
has LOTS of artillery ofc. But it's not numerous enough to win. Pro-Russian
analysts compare their advance with Barbarossa. But unlike Wehrmacht in 1941
Russian invaders have only *ONE ECHELON OF TROUPS*。




How is a Blitzkrieg organised? By echelons. First echelon is moving forward
as fast as they can. Ofc this means that lots of defenders will be left in
their rear. But then the second echelon comes, then third, etc. They finish
defenders, occupy territory, control the supply lines。

閃電戰是如何組織的？按梯隊。第一梯隊正在以最快的速度前進。當然這意味著許多後
衛將留在他們的後方。但是隨後第二梯隊來了，然後是第三梯隊，依此類推。他們終結了
守軍，佔領了領土，控制了補給線。

If Russia launched a proper Barbarossa-style Blitzkrieg that would happen now
- first, second, third echelons. But the second echelon didn't come. It never
existed. Why? First, Russia's *not* landmaxing and thus doesn't have so much
resources and infrastructure for the land war.



Secondly, launching several echelons would require long  arduous preparation.
You need to mobilise them, move to the borders, quarter, maintain and supply.
It's not that easy. It's a hard job that should have been done well in
advance to wage a Blitzkrieg. And it hadn't been done.



Why Russia didn't prepare a proper Blitzkrieg? And now we come for the third
and main reason. Blitzkrieg is a war strategy. Blitzkrieg is how you break &
suppress the enemy who's actually fighting. Russia didn't plan it because it
didn't plan a war. It planned a Special Operation.





Ofc partially that's just modern discourse. After WWII  traditional
understanding of sovereignty as of legal right of sovereign rulers to wage
offensive war died. As a result modern states never admit they're waging
wars. They're waging "pacifications", "counterterrorism", etc.



Consider how all the War Departments and Ministries over the world were
renamed into "Defence" in late 1940s. Everyone's defending, nobody's
attacking. Why does the fighting happen then? Well, because of criminals -
"bandits", "terrorists", "jihadees" or as now in Ukraine "Nazis".



Modern world abolished the distinction between the enemy and the criminal, a
key idea of the Roman Law. Powers do wage wars, but to do so they need to
criminalise and dehumanise their enemies. Hence, all the "terrorist"
discourse. In a sense Putin is going with the flow。




But on a deeper level Putin is absolutely correct. His declaration of
"special operation" in Ukraine is sincere, because he didn't expect the war.
He doesn't know how to do wars. For all of his life he's been organising and
launching the special operations。

但在更深層次上，普京是絕對正確的。他在烏克蘭宣布“特別行動”是真誠的，因為他沒
想到會發生戰爭。他不知道如何進行戰爭。他一生都在組織和發起特別行動。

First, as a KGB officer. Then, as St Petersburg city councillor for foreign
affairs (= illegally selling Soviet warehouse stuff to the West). In 1990s he
closely worked with the criminal world and he did it successfully. Here you
see him with a thief-in-law, Grandpa Hassan。

首先，作為KGB官員。然後，作為聖彼得堡市外交事務議員(=非法向西方出售蘇聯倉庫
的東西）。 1990 年代，他與犯罪界密切合作，並取得了成功。在這裡你看到他和一個小
偷哈桑爺爺。

推文圖址：
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FMoGcKtXoA82DSQ?format=jpg&name=small

Btw that's how Putin's pal Grandpa Hassan is celebrating with his close
circle. It gives some idea of Putin's business partners and associates.

順便說一句，下面影片就是普京的朋友哈桑爺爺與他的親密圈子慶祝的方式。
它讓我們了解了普京的商業夥伴和同事。

影片網址：
https://youtu.be/v941VC0wHJk?t=117

Putin worked with violent entrepreneurs used to killing. But. He had always
had the upper hand. Federal and regional governments were very much stronger
than these criminal bosses who were very much replaceable. Everyone of them
had dozens of henchmen who wanted to take his place.

普京與習慣於殺戮的暴力企業家一起工作。但。他總是佔上風。聯邦和地區政府比這些非
常容易被替換的犯罪頭目要強大得多。他們每個人都有幾十個心腹想要取代他的位置。

Putin waged special operations when he had much stronger position than these
criminals. And he got used to that. Later Yeltsin chose him as a successor
and in this capacity Putin launched a bunch of special operations to
consolidate power. Again with full support of higher ups.




Yeah, Putin played badass even before becoming a President. But it was easy
to play a badass when he was backed up by then President and the entire
apparatus of Kremlin. Huge power, no risk, no accountability.

是的，普京甚至在成為總統之前就表現得很糟糕。但是當他得到當時的總統和克里姆林宮
整個機構的支持時，他很容易扮演壞蛋。巨大的權力，沒有風險，沒有責任。

Later he initiated conflicts each time his had to boost his popularity and
tough image. Chechnya, Georgia, Syria. But neither of this was a war. Every
conflict was a Special operation waged:

1) for political goals
2) against small force which had no chance to win against Russia

後來，每次為了提升知名度和強硬形象，他都會引發矛盾。車臣，喬治亞，敘利亞。但
這兩者都不是戰爭。每一次沖突都是一場特別行動：

1) 政治目標
2) 對付沒有機會戰勝俄羅斯的小部隊


Putin fought only with small countries. Chechnya - 1 million people, Georgia
 - 4. Syria had more, but he fought with rebels, with no proper training or
armaments. Also "counterterrorist" discourse allowed Russians to simply level
entire cities to the ground with no consequences。



Every time Putin needed to confirm his alpha status he would devastate some
little country with a Special Operation. They didn't require proper
preparation because they bore no existential risk to Russia or to him. Like,
the fuck they're gonna do? No risk = no need to bother.

每次普京需要確認他的領袖地位時，他都會通過特別行動摧毀一些小國家。他們不需
要適當的準備，因為他們對俄羅斯或他沒有生存風險。就像，他們他媽的要做什麼？沒有
風險=無需費心。

Putin decided to repeat this little trick again. Hence, not that numerous
army of invasion, only one echelon of advance, etc. But Ukraine is much
bigger - it has 44 million people. What was Putin thinking? Apparently he was
expecting zero resistance from the Ukrainian army.



Putin had a good reason to believe so. Indeed, in 2014 Russian regulars ("
их там нет" = "there aren't any of them there") easily destroyed
Ukrainian forces in Debaltsevo and Ilovaysk. He saw that Ukrainian army is
weak and he can easily route them simply sending .

普京有充分的理由相信這一點。事實上，在 2014 年，俄羅斯的「小綠人(民兵」


*這段可能需要版友協助翻譯，in 2014 Russian regulars ("их там нет" =
 "there aren't any of them there") 要怎麼翻比較好？

**感謝speedwave及neutrino版友建議，暫譯如上**
 另外感謝KleinSchwarz版友的說明：


Strategically speaking Putin fucked up. He defeated Ukraine, inflicted pain
and humiliation. Anyone with an IQ above the room temperature knew the war is
not over and Russians would strike again. But - Putin didn't finish Ukraine
back then. He thought he'd always have a chance.



What happened next was quite predictable. Inflicting a painful but not
critical defeat on your enemy is risky. Yeah, they kinda became weaker. But
the balance of power within them changed. Court politics maxing interest
groups lost and efficiency maxing upstarts get a chance.




(待續)

(以上為俄羅斯的部分，因為實在太長，烏克蘭我稍後開另外一篇。)


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